

**00803**

**1962/10/27**

## INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

*File*

55-L

~~SECRET~~Action  
ARAControl: 19268  
Rec'd: October 27, 1962  
3 P.m.

010

Info

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

FILE

SS  
G  
SP  
L  
SAL  
EUR  
IO  
P  
IOP  
SCA  
INR  
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 899, October 27, 2 p.m.

NIACT

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

President Goulart called me to Palace 11 a.m. Saturday to discuss various aspects Cuban problem.

On stevedore union threat strike handling American ships, which Acting Labor Attache had taken up Friday with Gilberto Crockett, Goulart said he had called in union leaders Friday night, told them Brazil officially supporting blockade, and ordered them not to begin private war with US contrary GOB policy. Said they concurred and would issue official order today disclaiming intention strike.

Goulart then showed me letter just received from Tito of Yugoslavia asking GOB support in UN for suspension blockage in exchange Soviet promise stop sending arms to Cuba. I said difficulty this proposal was that Soviets had just demonstrated their untrustworthiness by introducing offensive arms in Cuba in face categorical assurances to contrary by both Khrushchev and Gromyko. Continuing blockage necessary until missile bases dismantled. Goulart appeared accept this argument noting that text Tito letter implicitly admitted Soviet offensive arms shipment. (Khrushchev public statement on Cuba and Turkey not available at time of conversation) Goulart then asked whether I saw any possibility UN taking over responsibility for blockade. I replied, that, apart from political aspects, this seemed to me technically very difficult. UN had had gravest difficulties organizing ground forces, and blockade was major naval operation for which very few countries equipped. I also

~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Guidelines 6.76

By MMK NARA, Date 10/6/01

~~SECRET~~

-2- 899, October 27, 2 p.m., from Rio de Janeiro

Emphasized that short run danger hostilities resulted not so much from blockade, on which appeared tacit understanding between Soviets and ourselves to avoid shooting incidents, but rather from continued base buildup in Cuba, which should be subject focus UN efforts. He appeared accept this and indicated possibility sending San Tiago Dantas to New York to assist negotiations.

Goulart then referred to his letter reported Embassy telegram 898, mainly to emphasize that it was purely personal message to President, not having character formal diplomatic document, and not being given either to Itamaraty or Brazilian Embassy, Washington. I promised report this.

Our discussion Soviet aircraft surveillance being reported separately NIACT.

Goulart asked whether I had any confirmation reported rumor from Roberto Campos that US had given 48 hour ultimatum to Cuba to stop base construction under pain military action. I replied in negative.

On internal security, Goulart said he had called in Communist leaders and told them to be wary organizing massive demonstration against US or GOB policy, which could only be harmful to them. If Cuban situation comes to involve bombardment or invasion, he foresees need drastic security actions here, including possibility state of seige.

Because commitment Presidential reception IPU, Goulart leaving for Brasilia 1600 Saturday. Returning Sunday or Monday, but will return at once if indications turn for worse in Cuban case.

GORDON

MJA

Note: Advance copies ARA & SS-O 10/27/62, CWO-JRL.

~~SECRET~~